走出去智库观察  

据报道，酝酿一年多的欧盟外国直接投资筛选框架草案由于塞浦路斯、希腊、卢森堡、马耳他及葡萄牙等国的反对，以及意大利和英国对计划态度保留，欧盟将延缓至今年2月或3月对该草案进行投票。

 

走出去智库(CGGT)特约法律专家、中资企业投资欧洲的法律专家、大成Dentons卢森堡分所合伙人章少辉认为，虽然欧盟的草案与美国CFIUS没有真正的可比性，但欧盟FDI审查框架一旦生效，将对来自第三国，尤其是来自中国的FDI，产生重大影响。因此在该草案生效之前，中国投资者应当对战略领域的FDI审查问题有着足够的认识，并且应当在市场分析阶段，就着手进行全面的风险评估。

 

欧盟FDI审查框架将对中国投资带来什么影响？今天，走出去智库(CGGT)刊发章少辉先生和张一凡女士的文章（中英文），供关注欧盟投资的读者参阅。

 

要 点

 

 

 

 

CGGT，CHINA GOING GLOBAL THINKTANK

 

1、中国投资的快速增长、尤其是其对欧盟战略领域的关注、国企的特殊角色，以及欧盟与中国对外国投资领域划分的不对等，这些原因都导致了欧盟对外国直接投资（FDI）的审查。

 

2、28个欧盟成员国中，仅有12个国家中存在以安全与公共秩序为基础的、符合国际法与欧盟法的FDI审查机制。

 

3、欧盟成员国在面对第三国FDI，也就是中方投资时的分歧，远远大于美国面对第三国FDI时的分歧。

 

4、在欧盟FDI审查框架下，成员国没有强制性义务设立FDI审查机制。此外，对威胁安全与公共秩序的FDI，欧盟委员会也没有被授予任何阻止或者否决的权力。 

 

正 文

 

 

 

 

CGGT，CHINA GOING GLOBAL THINKTANK

 

文/章少辉博士，张一凡女士(1)

 

2017年9月13日，欧盟委员会通过了一项条例草案，以安全与公共秩序为基础，建立对进入欧盟的外国直接投资（FDI）的审查框架（下称：“条例草案”）。(2)这意味着一旦条例草案生效，与美国的CFIUS审查相似，进入欧盟的重大FDI将受到严格的审查和批准流程的限制。

 

欧盟为什么启动FDI审查框架？欧盟FDI审查框架将会怎么样？未来的欧盟FDI审查框架是否与CFIUS类似？欧盟FDI审查框架将对中国投资带来什么样的影响？本文旨在回答这些问题。

 

I. 欧盟为什么启动FDI审查框架？

 

原因有很多——中国对欧盟投资急剧增加，欧盟热衷于欢迎FDI，同时也希望保护基本利益，中国国有企业（国企）可能被看作机遇的同时也可能被看作威胁。

 

· 中国在欧投资 – 急剧增长

 

自2008年经济危机后，中国在欧盟的投资开始增长。2009年，中国在欧投资约为20亿欧元，而2015年，该数额为超过200亿欧元，在仅仅6年内增长了10倍。2016年，中国在欧投资达到350亿欧元的总额，相比2015年增长了77%，相比2009年增长了超过17.5倍。

 

Source: Merics paper on China, “Record flows and growing imbalances – Chinese investment in Europe in 2016”.

 

这一增长不仅体现在数量上，也体现在价值上。仅在2016年，价值超过20亿欧元的收购包括：腾讯对芬兰游戏公司Supercell价值为67亿欧元的投资，美的对德国机器人公司KUKA价值为44亿欧元的收购，以及某中国财团以28亿欧元对英国数据中心运营商Global Switch的49%股权收购。 (3)

 

· 欧盟的态度–欢迎外国直接投资的同时保护基本利益

 

当欧洲南部的欧盟成员国欢迎FDI的同时，欧盟却对此保持更高的谨慎。正如欧盟委员会主席容克所说，“我们不是天真的自由贸易者。欧洲必须始终捍卫自己的战略利益”(4)。近年来，著名的涉及欧盟“重要利益”的中资收购包括：

 

军民两用技术和高科技方面：以前述的KUKA收购案作为关键案例，作为德国最重要的自动化开发商之一，KUKA的收购引起了极大的公众关注，以及对国家关键技术保护的担忧。

 

基础设施方面：最著名的案例之一即是中远集团在2016年中收购了希腊最大的港口Piraeus港51%的股权。国家安全和公共秩序：某中国财团计划收购德国半导体公司Aixtron。美国政府阻止该公司的美国资产出售、并通知德国政府后，德国政府撤回了最初的批准。

 

· 国企 - 机会还是威胁

 

在条例草案的解释备忘录中，欧盟委员会解释，对外国投资者——特别是国企——出于战略原因，收购拥有关键技术的欧洲公司的担忧一直存在，并且在投资来源国，欧盟投资者往往享受不到同样的权利(5)。中国国企在欧盟成员国的投资遭到了越来越多的反对。

 

以国家电网在比利时的失败投资计划为例：国家电网对澳大利亚配电公司Ausgrid的50.4%的股权收购被禁止后(6)，其对比利时一家电力和天然气配送系统运营商Eandis的8.3亿欧元收购再次失败，而这之前，比利时国家安全机构已就国家电网与中国国家机关间的关系，和比利时技术可能用于军事用途的风险，提出了警告(7)。中国的国家机关及其在战略领域的利益，不可避免地会引起投资目标国政府的关注。

 

中国投资的快速增长、尤其是其对欧盟战略领域的关注、国企的特殊角色，以及欧盟与中国对外国投资领域划分的不对等，这些原因都导致了FDI，尤其是中国投资，不仅被看作是机遇，也被看作是挑战，甚至在某些情形下，被看作对欧盟的潜在威胁。因此，对来自包括中国在内的第三国FDI，欧盟作出了通过建立欧盟层面的审查机制，以提高谨慎程度的决定。

 

II. 欧盟FDI审查框架将会怎么样？

 

· 现状

 

28个欧盟成员国中，仅有12个国家中存在以安全与公共秩序为基础的、符合国际法与欧盟法的FDI审查机制，分别为：奥地利、丹麦、德国、芬兰、法国、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、意大利、波兰、葡萄牙、西班牙以及英国。欧盟成员国间的FDI审查机制在范围上（包括对欧盟内FDI和欧盟外FDI的审查；审查门槛不同，覆盖的领域范围超出防卫范围），以及设计上（FDI的预先授权与事后审查）差异巨大。(8)

 

目前，关于FDI审查，以及关于像美国CFIUS这样的中央主管机构，都不存在欧盟层面的统一立法。在这个领域，无论是建立或是运行这样的机制，各成员国都是完全独立和自主的。欧盟委员会对此既无权限，又无决定权，也没有影响力。

 

Chart: FDI security-related screening procedures at EU Member-State level

Source: European Parliament Research Service, “Foreign direct investment screening – a debate in light of China-EU FDI flows”.

 

· 欧盟条例草案

 

2017年2月，德国、法国及意大利向欧盟提交信函，表达了担心，称缺乏互惠性将导致欧盟专业技术销售殆尽，而目前的规制手段却不够有效。9月，欧盟委员会通过了条例草案。

 

· 实质性要求

 

条例草案不要求成员国建立或者维持FDI审查机制。其目的是，为成员国创立起有利的框架，使其得以建立审查机制，并保证机制基本要求得到满足。对此，欧盟委员会对成员国提出了以下实质性要求：

 

1. FDI的定义：欧盟委员会将FDI定义为“外国投资者为了在某一成员国进行经济活动，而在外国投资者与其进行投资的企业家或者企业之间建立或者维护的持续的、直接的联系，包括能够有效参与公司经济活动的管理或者控制的投资”。值得注意的是，不仅直接的投资将受到条例草案的约束，对国内公司的有效参与或者实际控制也被包含在内。这表示，一旦条例生效，对外国投资者以及受益人的背景调查将更严格。

 

2. FDI审查：欧盟委员会表示，成员国可以在安全或者公共秩序的基础上，维护、修改或者通过FDI审查机制。欧盟委员会可以在同一基础上，对可能影响欧盟利益的项目进行FDI审查。这项原则将FDI审查的基础定义为安全和公共秩序。根据欧洲法院判决，安全与公共秩序必须被严格解释：必须存在除了纯粹经济利益之外的，对基础利益的真实且充足的严重危害。欧盟委员会表示，这种利益不应由成员国不经欧盟管控而单方面决定。其次，欧盟委员会与成员国都有审查FDI的权力，欧盟委员会应当在欧盟利益可能被FDI影响时行使专有权力。其三，当本国FDI审查机制符合条例草案的情况下，欧盟成员国可以维护现有机制。只要条例草案的基本要求通过国内法律得到满足，欧盟成员国甚至可以不建立任何审查机制。

 

3. 审查的考量因素：欧盟委员会给出了一份在决定FDI是否可能影响安全与公共秩序时应当考量的因素不完整列表，其中包括：

 

- 关键基础设施，包括能源、交通、通讯、数据存储、空间或者金融基础建设、以及敏感设施；

- 关键技术，包括人工智能、机器人、半导体，有潜在军民两用功能的技术，网络安全，太空技术或者核技术；

- 关键投入品的供应安全；或

- 获得敏感信息或者控制敏感信息的能力。

 

由于条例草案没有对考量因素进行完全列举，当建立或者修改国内审查制度时，成员国可以将本国利益因素考虑在内。

 

另外，外国投资者是否由第三国政府控制（包括资金支持的方式），也可能作为考量因素被考虑在内。届时备忘录中的这一条款旨在约束外国国有投资者或政府相关的投资者，也反映了前述的对国企扩张的担忧。

 

· 程序要求

 

条例草案规定了三项程序要求——透明和非歧视，通知和年度报告，以及合作机制。

 

透明和非歧视：根据这一规则，欧盟委员会要求成员国审查机制须对任何第三国都透明且不歧视。

 

通知和年度报告：成员国应当在条例草案生效后的30日内将本国现有的审查机制通知欧盟委员会。对审查机制进行任何修改或新通过任何审查机制的，成员国应当在该机制生效后30日内通知欧盟委员会。其次，已经有审查机制的成员国，应当向欧盟委员会提供审查机制适用情况的年度报告，包含FDI审查、禁止、或者有条件允许的信息，等等。没有审查机制的成员国，应当向欧盟委员会提供在其境内发生的FDI的年度报告。

 

合作机制：当FDI在某一成员国已经被审查或者正在被审查时，该成员国应当通知欧盟委员会以及其他成员国。如有必要，其他成员国和欧盟委员会可以要求审查发生国提供信息，例如所有权结构，最终控股股东，FDI价值，投资资金来源，等等。在收到信息时，其他成员国可以向该成员国提出评论，并将评论同时转发给欧盟委员会；欧盟委员会可以向该成员国发表意见。该成员国应当认真考虑评论和意见。以下是解释合作机制的图表：

 

· 生效

 

条例草案的最终投票批准预计将在2019年3月份欧盟议会全体大会进行，也就是说在2019年5月的欧盟选举之前。值得注意的是，尽管条例预计将在2019年中通过，具体实施则需要等到通过之后的18个月后。因此，条例的具体实施将可能不会早于2020年底。 

 

III. 即将到来的欧盟FDI审查框架是否与CFIUS类似？

 

· CFIUS作为模式？

 

权限：美国外国投资委员会（CFIUS）成立于1988年，以回应20世纪80年代日本对美国公司的收购，其任务为保护美国国家安全免于受到收购美国公司而产生的威胁。

 

三种威胁规则：尽管对国家安全威胁的定义在CFIUS 2009规定中没有明文规定，但一位知名学者对CFIUS案例进行的实证检验表明，这些威胁可以分为以下三种不同类型(9)：

 

o “第一种威胁来自于敏感技术可能泄露给外国公司或者政府，这些公司或者政府可能部署或者出售这些技术，而导致损害美国国家利益”(10)。

o “第二种威胁源自于外国收购者可能有能力，独立地或者根据本国政府指示，在新收购的生产者提供产出后，延迟、拒绝、或者设置条件”(11)。

o “第三种威胁来自于收购美国公司可能使得外国公司或者政府渗透到美国公司系统中的潜在可能，从而监视、实施监控，或者在这些系统中设置破坏性恶意软件”(12)。

 

· 中国投资面对CFIUS –案例研究

 

自几年前开始，中国在美重要投资或者甚至是在美国之外的投资，已经屡屡在CFIUS审查评估中失败。

 

2015年，CFIUS称，由于飞利浦在美国的巨大影响力，由中国南昌工业集团等控制的GO Scale Capital计划进行的对飞利浦照明部门的80%的收购，CFIUS对此有管辖权，并拒绝批准该交易。

 

“尽管飞利浦与CFIUS都没有对收购被阻止的原因发表任何意见，很明显关联公司的出售将涉及敏感的氮化镓技术（飞利浦照明所有）转让给中国政府可以得手的各方”(13)，根据Theodore H. Moran的分析，这属于第一种威胁的范围。

 

基于同样的原则，2016年，CFIUS建议放弃将德国半导体公司Aixtron出售给中国福建投资基金。CFIUS再次“关注氮化镓技术（GaN）泄露的潜在可能，因为Aixtron同飞利浦一样，是北约防卫承包商的GaN产品的主要供应商”(14)。

 

关于第二种威胁，2015年的一个中方收购一家加拿大稀土矿公司的案例，也许清楚地例证了所谓拒绝或者操纵几乎不存在替代品的关键投入品的获取的威胁。

 

2015年，一家中国矿业公司提出了非公开要约，想要收购一家加拿大稀土矿公司，该公司在加拿大、美国和南非拥有稀土矿产。稀土矿对航空与汽车工业尤为关键，中国已经控制了大约百分之九十的稀土矿出口。在中日双方岛屿争端的争议爆发期间，中国政府曾经下令中止对日本出口稀土矿。CFIUS选择了于其加拿大同僚相同立场，（在计划收购被公开宣布之前）建议各方，交易将不会被通过。(15)

 

中方投资也已受到CFIUS的第三种威胁的限制，即渗透，监视和破坏。

 

2007年，华为-贝恩资本-3 com的案例：贝恩资本对一家行业领先的美国硬件及软件网络公司3 com的收购被迫放弃，仅仅因为华为持有贝恩资本16.5%的股权。放弃收购很可能因为一旦收购完成，可能出现华为可以“将部分能力用于（通过‘黑门’或者陷阱）渗透、监视或者破坏由被收购公司提供的产品或服务”的威胁。(16)

 

3 Com案例一直困扰着华为，CFIUS在2011年禁止了华为对破产的美国公司3Leaf Systems进行云计算相关技术的收购，及雇用其员工。

 

最近，美国移动运营商巨头AT&T宣布将撤销出售华为智能手机的交易，这是由于美国政治家通过向电信监管机构，联邦通讯委员会（FCC）写信向AT&T施加政治压力，而FCC对美国手机或者其他设备的销售批准是必须的。信中称，他们长期关注中国间谍活动，特别是华为在间谍活动中的角色。(17)

 

另外一个最近的案例是2018年1月，阿里巴巴集团下的蚂蚁金服对MoneyGram价值为12亿美元的收购被禁止。CFIUS禁止了该提议，以缓解对可用于识别美国公民身份的数据安全的担忧。(18)

 

· 即将到来的欧盟FDI审查框架是否与CFIUS类似？

 

显然，对美国公司的外资收购，尤其是对常被看作对美国国家安全有威胁的中资M&A项目，CFIUS已经成为一个异常强大的审查和拒绝机构。即将到来的欧盟FDI审查框架是否会与CFIUS类似？

 

虽然我们不这么认为，但是，CFIUS 的基本原则，即著名的三种威胁规则，它的评估方法、决定制定和法律理论，将无可置疑地对欧盟FDI审查机制产生显著影响。

 

· 为什么作出这样的判断？

 

首先，欧盟与美国在政治背景与中央政府的决定权上是不同的。在美国，联邦政府在公共安全与国防事务上有专属权限，因此有最后决定权，而在欧盟框架下，公共安全与防御事务属于成员国的专属权限。欧盟委员会对此没有最终决定权。

 

其次，欧盟成员国在面对第三国FDI，也就是中方投资时的分歧，远远大于美国面对第三国FDI时的分歧。

 

根据Rasmussen Global的报告，“如何应对自2005年左右起大幅增长的中国投资，已经在欧洲产生了三个巨大的分歧：（1）政府相对私营领域的分歧；（2）对国家安全的担忧相对开放市场的承诺的分歧；和（3）东西欧之间与南北欧之间的分化”。(19)

 

最后，未来欧盟FDI审查框架，正如条例草案所提出的，似乎与CFIUS并不可类比。欧盟委员会充分意识到，强制推行像美国CFIUS那样一刀切的集中机制将不会被成员国支持，因此提出了中间路线的妥协方式。条例草案目的为建立起欧盟FDI审查框架，以及成员国与欧盟委员会之间的，以信息共享为基础的合作机制。(20)

 

这一框架的作用尤其在于，当在某一欧盟成员国进行的外国投资可能会影响另一成员国的安全或者公共秩序的情况下。然而，在该框架下，成员国还是没有强制性义务设立FDI审查机制。此外，对威胁安全与公共秩序的FDI，欧盟委员会也没有被授予任何阻止或者否决的权力。 

 

基于上述理由，我们认为未来欧盟FDI审查框架将无法与CFIUS相持并论。

 

IV. 欧盟FDI审查将对中方投资带来哪些影响？

 

虽然与CFIUS没有真正的可比性，欧盟FDI审查框架一旦生效，将对来自第三国，尤其是来自中国的FDI，产生重大影响。

 

条例草案目的在于“寻求（1）提高成员国与欧盟委员会间对战略投资（包括跨境投资）的透明度；（2）在没有审查机制的成员国间（仅12个成员国中存在审查机制），提高对战略领域FDI问题的认识；（3）提出安全问题，并将对具体问题的决定权留给成员国；以及（d）允许欧盟委员会审查影响欧盟利益的FDI，意即涉及欧盟资金的、或者通过欧盟立法成立的项目。”(21)

 

在这样的背景下，我们可以想象，首要影响的应当在于，对中方在欧洲的收购，尤其是对涉及战略领域的收购，将存在比以往更高的敏感度。对外国投资者，某些战略领域的准入将受到限制，甚至被简单地排除在外，尤其是在于关键基础建设、关键技术、关键投入品供应安全，以及敏感信息获取有关的领域。

 

其次，涉及欧盟战略领域的FDI交易的复杂性与不确定性必将提高。除了传统的收购步骤，例如市场调查、财务咨询、尽职调查、股权转让协议、交易融资与交易结束等之外，还可能增加一项复杂、不确定且耗时的FDI审查程序。此外，即使交易结束，也不能排除结束后的审查。因此，不确定性将变得更重要，并且可能在结束后给交易带来长期的麻烦。

 

最后，对那些涉及FDI审查程序的交易，交易成本将明显高于以往。

 

V. 对中国投资者的建议

 

即使在条例草案生效之前，中国投资者应当对战略领域的FDI审查问题有着足够的认识，并且应当在市场分析阶段，就着手进行全面的风险评估。

 

在此阶段，当决定对欧盟目标收购是否会被看作对欧盟安全与公共秩序存在严重威胁时，国际战略投资团队以及投资顾问可以在此扮演重要的角色。为评估这些风险，应当进行深入客观的分析和评估。

 

在交易阶段，尤其是在起草股权转让协议时，在先决条件章节中应当设定一系列条款和机制。这样，如果交易被欧盟国家当局拒绝，或欧盟发布否定意见，双方（尤其是中方）可以在没有损害、损失且毋须赔偿的情况下退出。

 

最后，即使交易结束后，也可能发生结束后的FDI审查，因此，建议在股权转让协议中就为此类情形准备好相应的救济。

 

结论

 

尽管被戏称“欧盟11点的醒觉”(22)，欧盟FDI审查框架一旦生效，将对第三国，尤其是对中资FDI，产生显著影响。

 

某些欧盟战略领域的准入将受到限制甚至直接被排除。触及欧盟战略领域的FDI交易的复杂性与不确定性必然会提升。这类涉及FDI审查程序的交易，交易成本也将明显提高。

 

中国投资者应当对欧盟战略领域FDI审查问题有敏锐的认识，并且，在交易前的市场分析阶段、交易中、甚至交易后，投资者都应当进行深入的风险分析。

 

最后，不确定性因素也可能产生于欧盟委员会和每个欧盟成员国对条例草案的不同实施情形。  

 

注：

(1)作者特别鸣谢Muireann Kelleher女士，Dentons欧洲区商务开拓主管，以及James Venit先生，大成Dentons布鲁塞尔合伙人，欧盟竞争法和反垄断法专家，对本文英文版本的审阅和建议。

(2)The proposed Regulation is available at  https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-487-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF. 

(3)Merics (Mercator Institute for China Studies), “Record flows and growing imbalances – Chinese investment in Europe in 2016”, Merics papers on China, January 2017, Page 6, available at http://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/RHG_Merics_COFDI_EU_2016.pdf.

(4)European Commission, “State of the Union 2017 - Trade Package: European Commission proposes framework for screening of foreign direct investments”, Brussels, 14 September 2017, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3183_en.htm.

(5)The proposed Regulation, page 2.

(6)TIAS School for Business and Society, “Perspective on China: Chinese Investments in ‘Strategic Sectors’”, October 6 2016, available at https://www.tias.edu/en/knowledgeareas/area/strategy-leadership/article/perspectives-on-china-chinese-investments-in-strategic-sectors.

(7)Idem.

(8)EPRS, “EU Framework for FDI Screening”, January 2018, available athttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614667/EPRS_BRI(2018)614667_EN.pdf. 

(9)Theodore H. Moran, “CFIUS and national Security: Challenges for the United States, Opportunities for the European Union”, Feb. 19, 2017 draft, Peterson Institute for International Economics, available athttps://piie.com/system/files/documents/moran201702draft-c.pdf.

(10) Idem.

(11)Idem.

(12) Idem.

(13) Idem.

(14)Idem. 

(15)Idem. 

(16)Idem. 

(17)Charles Arthur, “Will AT&T’s call to drop Huawei end phone maker’s US hopes?”, available athttps://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/13/huawei-china-american-atandt-deal-loss-end-us-ambitions-cyber-security-fears.

(18)Greg Roumeliotis , “U.S. blocks MoneyGram sale to China’s Ant Financial on national security concerns”, Reuters, January 2, 2018, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moneygram-intl-m-a-ant-financial/u-s-blocks-moneygram-sale-to-chinas-ant-financial-on-national-security-concerns-idUSKBN1ER1R7.

(19)Rasmussen Global, “Foreign Investment Screening and the China Factor – New protectionism or new European standards?”, Nov. 16, 2017, available at https://rasmussenglobal.com/media/foreign-investment-screening-china-factor-memo.

(20) Idem. 

(21)Idem.

(22)Rasmussen Global, op. cit. 

 

专家简介

章少辉 博士

中资企业投资欧洲的法律专家

 

座右铭：作为律师，最大的成就感是客户不受欺凌，不落陷阱，或者扭亏为盈！

 

章少辉博士是大成Dentons卢森堡分所合伙人，欧洲区中国客户部主任。章博士是一位有着丰富经验的公司法和收并购律师，专注于公司合并与收购、境外直接投资、银行及基金，上市(IPO)领域。他曾协助多家中国企业完成在卢森堡进行投资，及以卢森堡为平台在欧盟市场进行投资。章博士也为欧洲企业拓展中国市场提供咨询。  

 

章博士对中国投资者的欧洲法律市场需求有着深入了解，他是欧洲华人律师协会(ACLE)的发起人之一，并曾担任协会第一和第二任会长。

 

章博士被《2013年钱伯斯全球概览》评为“卢森堡公司/商法（外国专家）杰出律师”，及“中国公司/并购领域（国际律师事务所）杰出律师”。

 

经典案例有：为航天三院，上海汽车等几家汽车行业的中国战略投资者就收购IEE集团（一家总部位于卢森堡的全球专业传感系统创新研发商）提供法律服务。此次交易是中国投资者在卢森堡首次和最大规模的收购之一。

 

协助苏交科集团收购Testamerica项目，包括协助客户成功完成美国外商投资委员会（CFIUS）审批程序。

 

为某国际时装集团在中国的上市项目提供法律意见，包括提供尽职调查报告和22份法律意见，涉及其在欧洲和亚洲各个司法管辖区的22家子公司。 该客户是一家旗下有九个时尚品牌的国际时装集团，并在全球拥有超过3000家精品店。

 

协助中国光大银行在卢森堡开设分行和子行的重大合同法律审阅 / 协助多家卢森堡私募股权公司在中国的投资。

 

协助某高科技人工智能研发集团：为其在1）卢森堡设立欧洲总部，2）计划收购多家欧洲同行企业，以及3）设立投资基金提供法律服务。

 

 

张一凡

 

张一凡女士是大成Dentons卢森堡分所公司法和中国客户部的律师助理。她专注于公司法，并购与重组，和私募股权领域。

 

 

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English version

 

EU FDI screening and its impact on Chinese investments

 

By Dr. Shaohui ZHANG and Ms. Yifan ZHANG（1）

 

On September 13, 2017, the European Commission (the Commission) adopted a proposal for a regulation establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the EU on the grounds of security or public order (the proposed Regulation). （2）

 

This means that, as in the US, significant FDI in the EU will be subject to a rigorous screening and approval process once the proposed Regulation comes into force.

 

Why is the EU launching this FDI screening framework? What is the EU FDI Screening Framework? Will the upcoming EU FDI screening framework be comparable to CFIUS? What impact will EU FDI screening have on Chinese investments? We aim to answer these questions in this article.

 

I. Why is the EU launching its FDI screening framework?

 

There are a number of reasons for this – Chinese investments into the EU have increased dramatically, the EU is keen to welcome FDI while also wanting to protect essential interests, and China State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) may be considered opportunities as well as threats.

 

· Chinese investments into the EU have increased dramatically

 

Chinese investments into the EU began to increase following the 2008 financial crisis. In 2009, Chinese investments in the EU amounted to roughly €2 billion. By 2015, the amount has increased to over €20 billion, representing a tenfold growth in just six years. In 2016, Chinese investments in the EU reached a total of €35 billion, a 77% increase from 2015 and more than 17 times greater than in 2009.

 

Source: Merics paper on China, “Record flows and growing imbalances – Chinese investment in Europe in 2016”.

 

The growth is not only reflected by volume but also by value. In 2016 alone, acquisitions valued at over €2 billion included: the acquisition of Syngenta by ChemChina, with a record deal value of EUR 40.7 billion; the acquisition of 10.5% of the shareholding in UK National Grid by CIC, more than EUR 13 billion; the €6.7 billion investment by the Tencent-led consortium in the Finnish gaming company Supercell; Midea’s €4.4 billion acquisition of German robotics company KUKA; and the 49% stake by a Chinese consortium in UK data center operator Global Switch, valued at €2.8 billion. （3）

 

· The EU’s attitude – welcoming FDI while protecting essential interests 

 

While southern Member States welcome FDI, the European Commission maintains a much stricter scrutiny in such matters. As Mr. Juncker, president of the Commission, has said, “We are not naïve free traders. Europe must always defend its strategic interests”.（4） In recent years, major Chinese acquisitions have touched “essential interests” of the EU including: technology, infrastructure and national security.

 

As concerns technology we can take the above-mentioned KUKA acquisition as a key example. As one of the most important automotive developers in Germany, KUKA’s acquisition drew huge public attention, with concerns about protecting a critical national technology. One of the most famous examples on the infrastructure front is COSCO’s acquisition of 51% stake in the port of Piraeus, Greece’s largest port in mid-2016. In terms of national security and public order – we have the example of Aixtron  where: the German government withdrew its initial approval for the potential Chinese takeover of German semiconductor manufacturer Aixtron, after the US government blocked the sale of the company’s US assets and informed Germany.

 

· China SOE investments – opportunities or threats

 

In the explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed regulation, the Commission explains that there have been some concerns about foreign investors, notably state-owned enterprises, taking over European companies with key technologies for strategic reasons, and that EU investors often do not enjoy the same rights to invest in the country from which the investment originates.（5） Investments made by Chinese SOEs are encountering more and more opposition in EU Member States.

 

For example, let’s consider the failed investment plan of State Grid in Belgium. After State Grid was blocked by Australia from acquiring a 50.4% stake in electricity distribution firm Ausgrid,（6） its €830 million investment in Belgian power and gas distribution system operator Eandis was also rejected. This was because the Belgian State Security Agency warned of the link between State Grid and the Chinese authorities, and the risk that Belgian technology could be used for military purposes.（7） Chinese authorities and their interests in strategic sectors inevitably raise concern for target state government.

 

Due to the rapid growth of Chinese investments, and especially the particular focus on EU strategic sectors, the role of SOEs, and the uneven playing field for foreign investors in China, FDI, especially Chinese investment, is seen not only as opportunity but also a challenge. In certain circumstances it is even viewed as a potential threat to the EU. Consequently, the EU has now decided to increase its scrutiny regarding FDI from third countries, including China, by establishing a screening framework at an EU level.

 

II. What is the EU FDI screening framework?

 

· The current status

 

Only 12 out of the 28 EU Member States (namely Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the UK), have an existing FDI screening system in place on grounds of security or public order, in line with international and EU laws. However, EU Member States’ FDI screening mechanisms vary significantly in scope (including the review of intra- or extra-EU FDI, differing screening thresholds, and the breadth of sectors covered beyond defense) and in design (prior authorization versus ex-post screening of FDI). （8）

 

Currently, there is neither harmonized legislation at the EU level for FDI screening nor a competent centralized organism, like CFIUS in the US. Each Member State is fully sovereign and autonomous in this area, for establishing and/or for the ongoing operation of such a mechanism. The EU Commission has no competence, decision-making powers, or influence in this matter.

 

Chart: FDI security-related screening procedures at EU Member-State level

Source: European Parliament Research Service, “Foreign direct investment screening – a debate in light of China-EU FDI flows”.

 

· The proposed Regulation 

 

In February 2017, Germany, France and Italy submitted a letter to the European Commission regarding their concerns that the lack of reciprocity would lead to a potential sell-off of European expertise, because current instruments are not sufficiently effective. In September 2017, the Commission issued the proposed Regulation.

 

· Substantial requirements

 

The proposed Regulation does not require Member States to adopt or maintain a screening mechanism for FDI. Rather its objective is to create an enabling framework for Member States to put a screening mechanism in place, and to ensure that the basic requirements of such a mechanism will should be met. In this regard, the Commission sets out the following substantial requirements for EU Member States:

 

1. Definition of FDI: the Commission defines FDI as “investments of any kind by a foreign investor aiming to establish or to maintain lasting and direct links between the foreign investor and the entrepreneur to whom or the undertaking to which the capital is made available in order to carry on an economic activity in a Member State, including investments which enable effective participation in the management or control of a company carrying out an economic activity”. Notably, not only will a direct investment be regulated by the proposed Regulation; an effective participation or actual control of a domestic undertaking will also be regulated. This means there will likely be a stronger background check of foreign investors as well as beneficiarl owners once the proposed Regulation comes into force.

 

2. Screening of FDI: the Commission notes that Member States may maintain, amend or adopt mechanisms to screen FDI on the grounds of security or public order. The Commission may screen FDI that is likely to affect projects or programs of EU interest on the same grounds. This principle defines the basis of FDI screening as security and public order. According to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), security and public order must be interpreted strictly: there should be a genuine and sufficient serious threat to a fundamental interest beyond merely pure economic interest. The Commission has indicated that such interest should not be determined unilaterally by the Member States without any control by the EU. Second, both the Commission and Member States have the competence to screen FDI, while the Commission may exercise its exclusive competence when EU interests are likely to be affected by FDI. Furthermore EU Member States may maintain their existing national FDI screening mechanism, provided that they are in line with the proposed Regulation. As long as the basic requirements set out in the proposed Regulation are met through national laws, the EU Member States are allowed to not establish a screening mechanism.

 

3. Factors taken into consideration in screening: the Commission sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors that should be taken into account in determining whether FDI is likely to affect security or public order, being, inter alia:

 

§ critical infrastructure, including energy, transport, communications, data storage, space or financial infrastructure, as well as sensitive facilities;

§ critical technologies, including artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors, technologies with potential dual use applications, cybersecurity, space or nuclear technology;

§ the security of supply of critical inputs; or

§ access to sensitive information or the ability to control sensitive information

 

The proposed Regulation offers a non-exhaustive list, which means, by establishing or amending national regime, Member States may take their own interest into account.

 

It also mentions that consideration may be given as to whether the foreign investor is controlled by the government of a third country, including through significant funding. Aiming to regulate foreign state-owned or state-related investors, this paragraph in the explanatory memorandum reflects the concern about the SOEs expanding as discussed above.

 

· Procedural requirements

 

There are three important procedural requirements – transparency and non-discrimination, notification and annual report, and the cooperation mechanism.

 

Under the rule of transparency and non-discrimination, the Commission requires Member States to establish a screening mechanism that is transparent and non-discriminatory between third countries;

 

With respect to notification and annual reporting, Member States shall notify the Commission of their existing screening mechanism within 30 days after the proposed Regulation enters into force. Member States most notify any amendments to an existing mechanism or the adoption of a new screening mechanism to the Commission within 30 days of such mechanism entering into force. Second, Member States with a screening mechanism must provide the Commission with an annual report on the application of their screening mechanism including information relating to FDI screening, any prohibitions or conditions imposed, etc. Member State without a screening mechanism must provide an annual report covering FDI in their territory to the Commission.

 

Cooperation Mechanism: when FDI not subject to the Commission’s review is undergoing screening in one Member State, that Member State must inform the Commission and the other Member States. If deemed necessary, other Member States and the Commission may request information from the Member State where screening is taking place, such as information about the ownership structure, the ultimate controlling shareholder, the value of the FDI, the funding of the investment.. Upon receipt of this information, the other Member States may then provide comments to the Member State, forwarding these to the Commission in parallel. The Commission may then issue an opinion addressed to the Member State. The Member State must give due consideration to the comments and the opinion. Below is a chart explaining the cooperation mechanism:

 

 

· Entry into force

 

A final vote signing off on the proposed Regulation is expected to take place at a European Parliament plenary session in March 2019, ahead of the upcoming EU elections in May 2019. Although the proposed Regulation is expected to enter into force by mid-2019, it shall only apply from 18 months after its entry into force. Full application is therefore not expected before November 2020. 

 

III. Will the upcoming EU FDI screening framework be comparable to CFIUS?

 

· CFIUS as model?

 

Competence: Established in 1988 in reaction to Japanese acquisitions of US companies in the 1980s, the mandate of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (the “CFIUS”) aims to protect the US against national security threats that might emerge from foreign takeovers of US firms.

 

Three threats rules: Although the definition of threats to national security was left open in the CFIUS 2009 regulation, a firsthand examination of CFIUS cases has been made by an eminent scholar, Professor Theodore H. Moran and shows that such threats may be classified into the following three distinct types（9）:

 

o “The first threat derives from a possible leakage of sensitive technology to a foreign company or government that might deploy or sell such technology so as to be harmful to UA national interests”.（10）

o “The second threat springs from the ability of the foreign acquirerer, acting independently or under instructions from the home government, to delay, deny, or place conditions upon provision of output from the newly acquired producer”.（11）

o “The third threat derives from the potential that acquisition of a US company might allow a foreign company or its government to penetrate the US company’s systems so as to monitor, conduct surveillance, or place destructive malware with in those systems”.（12）

 

· Chinese investments facing CFIUS – a case study

 

For several years, significant Chinese investments in the US, or even outside the US, have been subjected to CFIUS screening reviews.

 

In 2015, CFIUS claimed jurisdiction over the proposed acquisition of 80% of Philips’ Lumileds division by GO Scale Capital, over which Nanchang Industrial Group of China, among others, holds control. Permission for the deal was refused due to the large Philips presence in the US.

 

“Although neither Philips nor CFIUS would comment on why the acquisition was blocked, it became clear that the sale of this affiliate would involve transfer of the sensitive gallium nitride technology (that Lumileds possesses) to parties that could be accessed by the Chinese government”, falling into the scope of the first threat, according to the analysis of Professor Moran.（13）

 

The same underlying principle was applied by CFIUS in 2016 in its recommendation to abandon the proposed sale of the German semiconductor firm Aixtron to China Fujian Chip Investment Fund LP. CFIUS once again “focused on potential leakage of gallium nitride technology (GaN) since Aixtron, like Philips, is a key supplier of GaN products to NATO defense contractors”.   （14）

 

Regarding the second threat, a Chinese acquisition of a Canadian rare earths mining company case in 2015 clearly illustrates the threat of denial or manipulation of access to critical inputs for which there are few readily available substitutes.

 

 “In 2015 a Chinese mining company made a non-public proposal to acquire a Canadian mining firm that owned rare-earths properties in Canada, the United States, and South Africa. China already controls approximatively 90 percent of rare-earth export that are critical for the aerospace and automotive industries. The Chinese government has ordered the withholding of rare-earth exports to Japan during periods of time when disputes about islands claimed by both China and Japan have flared up. CFIUS joined its counterpart in Canada in advising the parties (even prior to public announcement of the proposed acquisition) that the deal would not be permitted to go through.” （15）

 

Chinese investments have also been subject to CFIUS screening under the third threat of penetration, surveillance and sabotage.

 

In the 2007 Huawei–Bain Capital–3 Com Case, the acquisition of 3 Com, a leading US hardware and software network company, by Bain Capital, in which Huawei holds only 16.5% of shareholding, was abandoned. Most likely this is because, should the deal be concluded, a threat might exist that Huawei could “insert some capacity for infiltration, surveillance or sabotage (via “blackdoors” or trapdoors”) into the goods and services provided by the acquired company”.（16）

 

The 3 Com case has plagued Huawei ever since. In 2011 CFIUS blocked Huawei from acquiring the cloud computing-related technology of, and hiring employees from, insolvent US firm 3Leaf Systems.

 

More recently, the US mobile giant AT&T announced that it was pulling out of a deal to sell Huawei smartphones, as a result of political pressure on AT&T by American politicians. The politicians had written to the telecoms regulator the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) – which must approve the sale of phones and other devices in the US – saying they had “long been concerned about Chinese espionage in general, and Huawei’s role in that espionage in particular”.（17）

 

Another recent case is that of the blocked US$1.2 billion sale of MoneyGram to Ant Financial under Alibaba group, in January 2018. CFIUS rejected this proposal in response to concerns over the safety of data that can be used to identify US citizens（18）

 

· Will the upcoming EU FDI screening framework be comparable to CFIUS?

 

Obviously, CFIUS review has become an extremely powerful means for screening and blocking foreign takeovers of US firms, in particular Chinese M&A projects, which are considered to be threats to the US national security.  However, will the upcoming EU FDI screening framework be comparable to CFIUS?

 

We don’t think so, although, CFIUS’ underlying principles, i.e., the famous three threats rules, its evaluation method, its decision-making, and its legal theory, will undoubtedly exercise significant influence on the EU FDI screening framework.

 

Why such an assessment?

 

First, the political background and the central governments’ decision powers differ significantly between the EU and the US. In the US, the Federal Government has exclusive competence as concerns public security and defense matters and thus has final decision-making power. Under the EU framework, both public security and defense matters are the exclusive competence of the individual Member States. The EU Commission has no final decision-making power on such matters, its powers being limited to the recommendation provided for under the proposed regulation, although as noted Member States are required to “take utmost account” of the Commission’s recommendation and must justify any decision not to follow it..  

 

Second, EU Member States views are much more divergent than those in the US when facing third country FDI, namely Chinese investments.  

 

According to Rasmussen Global, “Questions about how to cope with the massive surge in Chinese investment since the mid-2010s have laid bare three cross-cutting cleavages in Europe: (1) government versus private sector; (2) concerns with national security versus commitments to open markets; and (3) East-West as well as North-South divisions”.（19）

 

Last, the screening framework proposed by the draft regulation does not seem to be comparable to CFIUS. The Commission, fully aware that imposing a one-size-fits-all centralized mechanism like CFIUS in the USA, would not be supported by all Member States, and thus has proposed a middle-of-the-road compromise. The proposed Regulation aims to set up an EU framework for FDI screening and a cooperation mechanism between Member States and the Commission that is based on information sharing.（20）

 

In particular, this framework comes into play when a foreign investment in one EU Member State may affect the security or public order in another. However, under such framework, Member States are not obliged to adopt an FDI screening mechanism, nor will the EU Commission have any absolute blocking power or veto over FDI deemed to pose a threat to security or public order.

 

These are some of the reasons why we believe that the upcoming EU FDI screening framework will not be comparable to CFIUS.

 

IV. What impact will EU FDI Screening have on Chinese investments?

 

Although not really comparable to CFIUS, the EU FDI screening framework, once it comes into force, will have significant impact on third country FDI, in particular those from China.

 

The proposed Regulation “seeks to a) increase transparency between member states and the Commission on strategic investment, including cross-border investment; b) raise awareness about the issue of FDI in strategic sectors among member states without a screening mechanism (only 12 member states have one); c) raise the issue of security but leave decisions on specific cases to the member states; and d) allow the European Commission to screen FDI affecting projects of an EU interest, i.e. projects funded by the EU or subject to EU legislation”.（21）

 

Given this background, the first impact we can anticipate will likely be increased sensitivity towards any Chinese takeovers in the EU, especially those touching strategic sectors. For those foreign investors, access to certain strategic sectors will be conditional or may even simply be precluded, especially in sectors relating to critical infrastructure, critical technologies, the security of supply of critical inputs, and the access to sensitive information.

 

Second, the complexity and uncertainty of FDI deals touching strategic sectors in EU will certainly increase. Apart from the traditional takeover steps, like market screening, financial advice, DD, negotiation, SPA, deal financing and closing, a complex, uncertain and time consuming FDI screening procedure might be added. Even post-closing screening may not be excluded. Here in particular we expect that the uncertainty will become more important and may plague those deals for a long period after closing.

 

Last, transaction cost of such deals involving FDI screening procedures will obviously be higher than before.

 

V. Advice to Chinese investors

 

Even before the entry into force of the proposed Regulation, Chinese investors should take into account the likelihood of FDI screening in strategic sectors in the EU, and should proceed to a full assessment of risks already at the market screening stage.

 

At this stage, the international strategic investment team and the investment advisor may play an important role in determining if the takeover of the EU target might be considered as presenting serious threats to the security or public order in the EU. Comprehensive and objective analysis and evaluation should be undertaken in order to assess such risks.  

 

During the transaction stage, in particular in the drafting of the SPA, a series of clauses and mechanisms could be proposed in the condition precedent chapter. These could be designed to allow one or both parties, to exit without damage, harm and indemnity should the deal be refused by the national authorities or in case of an adverse opinion issued by the EU.

 

Last, even after the closing, post-closing FDI screening might occur. Thus it is advisable to already make preparations for a worst case scenario in the SPA, including the necessary remedies.  

 

Conclusion

 

Although qualified as “the EU 11^th hour awakening”（22）, the EU FDI screening framework, once it comes into force, will have significant impact on third country FDI, in particular those from China

 

Access to certain EU strategic sectors will be conditional or even totally precluded. The complexity and uncertainty of FDI deals which touch strategic sectors in the EU will certainly increase. The transaction costs of deals which involve FDI screening will obviously increase as well.

 

Chinese investors need to have a keen awareness for FDI screening issues, especially with respect to strategic sectors in the EU, and should undertake a comprehensive assessment of the risks at the market screening stage, during the transaction and even after the closing.  

 

Last, there may also be some uncertainty around how the Commission and each of the EU Member States will implement the proposed Regulation.

 

annotation：

 

(1)Dr. Shaohui ZHANG is a partner of Dentons Luxembourg, invited professor at the University of Luxembourg and at Ji’nan University, Guangzhou. Ms. Yifan ZHANG is an associate of Dentons Luxembourg. The authors would like to thank Mrs. Muireann Kelleher, Dentons’ Europe Head of MBD Operations, and Mr. James Venit, partner of Dentons Brussels specialized in EU competition and antitrust laws, for their review and comments to the English version of this paper.  

(2)The proposed Regulation is available at https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-487-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF. 

(3)Merics (Mercator Institute for China Studies), “Record flows and growing imbalances – Chinese investment in Europe in 2016”, Merics papers on China, January 2017, Page 6, available at http://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/RHG_Merics_COFDI_EU_2016.pdf.

(4)European Commission, “State of the Union 2017 - Trade Package: European Commission proposes framework for screening of foreign direct investments”, Brussels, 14 September 2017, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3183_en.htm.

(5)The proposed Regulation, page 2.

(6)TIAS School for Business and Society, “Perspective on China: Chinese Investments in ‘Strategic Sectors’”, October 6 2016, available at https://www.tias.edu/en/knowledgeareas/area/strategy-leadership/article/perspectives-on-china-chinese-investments-in-strategic-sectors.

(7)Idem.

(8)EPRS, “EU Framework for FDI Screening”, January 2018, available athttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614667/EPRS_BRI(2018)614667_EN.pdf. 

(9)Theodore H. Moran, “CFIUS and national Security: Challenges for the United States, Opportunities for the European Union”, Feb. 19, 2017 draft, Peterson Institute for International Economics, available athttps://piie.com/system/files/documents/moran201702draft-c.pdf.

(10) Idem.

(11)Idem.

(12) Idem.

(13) Idem.

(14)Idem. 

(15)Idem. 

(16)Idem. 

(17)Charles Arthur, “Will AT&T’s call to drop Huawei end phone maker’s US hopes?”, available athttps://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/13/huawei-china-american-atandt-deal-loss-end-us-ambitions-cyber-security-fears.

(18)Greg Roumeliotis , “U.S. blocks MoneyGram sale to China’s Ant Financial on national security concerns”, Reuters, January 2, 2018, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moneygram-intl-m-a-ant-financial/u-s-blocks-moneygram-sale-to-chinas-ant-financial-on-national-security-concerns-idUSKBN1ER1R7.

(19)Rasmussen Global, “Foreign Investment Screening and the China Factor – New protectionism or new European standards?”, Nov. 16, 2017, available at https://rasmussenglobal.com/media/foreign-investment-screening-china-factor-memo.

(20) Idem. 

(21)Idem.

(22)Rasmussen Global, op. cit. 

 

Expert profile

 

Dr. Shaohui Zhang

Partner, Head of Europe - China Desk Luxembourg

 

Shaohui Zhang is a partner in Dentons’ Luxembourg office and head of the Dentons Europe China Desk. Shaohui has extensive experience as a corporate lawyer and focuses on mergers and acquisitions, foreign direct investments, and initial public offerings. He assists Chinese companies investing into Luxembourg or using Luxembourg as an entry point into the EU common market. He also advises European companies expanding into China.

 

He is also one of the founders and former president of the Association for Chinese Lawyers in Europe (ACLE), giving him unique insight into the needs of Chinese investors.

 

He was ranked by Chambers Global 2013 as Leading individual in Corporate/Commercial (Foreign Experts) in Luxembourg and in Corporate/M&A (International Firms) in China.

 

Yifan Zhang

 

Yifan Zhang is an associate in Dentons’ Luxembourg office. She is a member of the Corporate practice group and of the Luxembourg China Desk. She focuses on corporate law, mergers and acquisitions and private equity.